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I. INTRODUCTION
Contract law uses three measures of damages.
The expectation
measure puts the injured party in as good a position
as if the contract
had been performed (i.e., not breached).' The
reliance measure puts
the injured party in as good a position as if the
contract had not been
made.2 The restitution measure restores to the
injured party any benefit the breaching party obtained from his breach
at the injured
party's expense. 3
Although the expectation measure has always been
the norm, 4 Lon
L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr. famously
questioned its primary
status in an article that appeared in 1936.5 They
began by asserting
that each of the measures compensates the injured
party for the loss
of an associated "interest" in the contract-the
expectation measure
compensates for the loss of the "expectation
interest," the reliance
measure compensates for the loss of the "reliance
interest," etc. They
then ranked these "interests" in what they considered
to be the order
of their importance, putting the restitution interest
first and the expectation interest last:
It is obvious that the three "interests" we have
distinguished do not present
equal claims to judicial intervention.... The "restitution
interest," involving a
combination of unjust impoverishment with unjust
gain, presents the strongest case for relief. If, following Aristotle, we regard
the purpose of justice as
the maintenance of an equilibrium of goods among
members of society, the
restitution interest presents twice as strong a claim
to judicial intervention as
the reliance interest, since ifA not only causes B
to lose one unit but appropri-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8 (3d ed.
1999).
Id. § 12.1.
Id.
Id. § 12.8.
L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in ContractDamages
(pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37). Relevant
excerpts of Part I are reprinted in the Appendix.
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and B is not one
ates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy between A
unit but two.
On the other hand, the promisee who has actually relied on the promise,
certainly
even though he may not thereby have enriched the promisor,
merely dewho
promisee
the
than
relief
for
case
pressing
more
a
presents
was promised
mands satisfaction for his disappointment in not getting what
compensation for
him. In passing from compensation for change of position to
from the realm of
loss of expectancy we pass, to use Aristotle's terms again,
no longer seeks
law
The
justice.
distributive
of
that
to
corrective justice
a new situation.
being
into
bring
to
but
quo,
merely to heal a disturbed status
[sic] a more active
It ceases to act defensively or restoratively, and assumed
its self-evident
role. With the transition, the justification for legal relief loses
normal rule
the
why
explain
to
thing
easy
no
fact
of
quality. It is as a matter
by the value of
of contract recovery should 6 be that which measures damages
the promised performance.

why
After thus concluding that "it is. . . no easy thing" to explain
the
what
explore
to
on
went
they
norm,
the
is
the expectation measure
although
that
7
reason or reasons might be. They eventually concluded
the expectation interest,
there were no good reasons for protecting
damages
there was a good reason for using the expectation measure of
same
the
in
results
generally
it
claimed,
as the norm: because, they
to prove. 8
easier
is
and
would
measure
reliance
the
recovery as
has
The Fuller and Perdue article and its "three interests thesis"
United
the
in
influence
academic
and
had an immense scholarly
the
States. Richard Craswell cited over sixty publications treating
9
2000.
in
published
three interests thesis in his article on the subject
reA recent Lexis search of the "Law Reviews, Combined" database 10
years.
two
last
the
within
article
the
to
vealed twenty-six citations
of the proper
The effect of the article has been to throw the question
convincingly
been
has
it
measure of damages into doubt. Although
expectation
the
incorrect-that
is
shown that the article's conclusion
meareliance
the
as
recovery
same
the
in
measure generally results
expecthe
that
conclusion
further
article's
the
that
sure would"-so
reliance
tation measure generally makes a good surrogate for the
generally
other
any
with
up
come
measure is wrong, no one has yet
being the
accepted reason or reasons for the expectation measure
interthree
norm. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the
offers
and
it
stated
ests thesis almost verbatim as Fuller and Perdue
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 57-60.
Id. 60-62.
L. REv. 99, 105-21
Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CH.

(2000).

10. The search was conducted by Paul Kroeger, a student at the author's law school,
on May 31, 2001.
(1958); Melvin
11. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 153-54
73 CAL. L.
Contract,
of
Breach
for
Damages
Cooter,
Aron Eisenberg & Robert
REV. 1434, 1445-49 (1985).
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no reasons for preferring any one of the measures
over the other
two.12 No hornbook, treatise or casebook in print offers
any such reasons either, and nearly all of them mention the Fuller
and Perdue article and comment upon it favorably.13
Despite its immense scholarly and academic influence,
however,
the article and its thesis have had no discernible effect
on the law.
The expectation measure continues to be the norm, 14
and even in the
situations for which the contracts restatements have
explicitly suggested a flexible approach to damages, the courts continue
to use the
expectation measure almost exclusively of the other
two. 15
As demonstrated below, the courts have rightfully used
the expectation measure to the near exclusion of the other two
measures. Toward that end, Part II of this Article sets forth
the principal
institutions in a modern market economy in which contracts
are used.
Part III refutes the Fuller and Perdue three interests
thesis by explaining how the expectation measure meets the needs
of these principal institutions in four crucial respects, while showing
that neither of
the other measures meets these needs in even one such
respect. Part
IV exposes further endemic weaknesses in the three
interests thesis.
Part V concludes by showing that the three interests
thesis is too
flawed to be of use for comparing the merits of the
three damages
measures.

12.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 344 (1981) (Purposes of Remedies)

states:

Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement
serve to
protect one or more of the following interests of the
promisee:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in
having the benefit
of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in
had the contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being
reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in
as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract not been
made, or
(c) his "restitution interest," which is his interest in
having restored to
him any benefit that he has conferred on the other
party.
13. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14.4
(4th ed. 1998) (hornbook); CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL.,
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW
960-61 (4th ed. 1999) (casebook).
14. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.8.
15. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance
in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197 (1990) (concluding that despite the
urging in both the Restatement (First)of Contracts section 90 and Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section
90 to take a more flexible approach, the courts, without
exception, have used the
expectation measure whenever they could for breaches
of contracts made enforceable by detrimental reliance rather than by consideration).
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THE PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONS IN A MODERN MARKET
ECONOMY IN WHICH CONTRACTS ARE USED
Almost every purchase and sale in a modern market economy involves a contract, even if the contract sometimes only consists of imin
plied warranties. (By a "market economy" I mean an economy
compete
to
sellers
for
is
business
doing
of
means
which the dominant
a
with one another in largely unregulated markets.) I will deem
purthe
if
market
purchase and sale to have occurred in an economic
chaser had a choice of whom to purchase from, because the availabilof
ity of such a choice is the essential condition for the existence
modern
a
in
choice
a
such
has
always
nearly
purchaser
A
competition.
inmarket economy. The economic market is one of the two principal
stitutions in which contracts are used.
The other is the institution of credit and finance. Contracts in this
context are the things which are bought and sold as well as the usual
for
means of buying and selling them. Stocks and bonds are contracts,
not
are
that
contracts
of
kinds
numerous
are
there
Although
example.
typically used in either of these institutions, these two are so important to the functioning of a modern market economy that if contracts
did not meet their needs, the economy could not function.
II.

A.

The Institution of the Economic Market: Contracts as
Bargains

Every developed country in the world has a market economy. The
few socialist economies still left are in or near collapse. Economic
markets operate through bargains and could not operate without
is bought and sold.
them. There is a bargain every time anything
16
promises made enand
enforce,
will
law
the
Contracts are promises
and the
consideration
The
bargains.
are
consideration
by
forceable
Albargain.
the
of
promise or promises it supports are the two sides
include
them
of
all
not
because
though not all bargains are contracts,
perpromises, bargains must be contracts if any part of one party's
at
which
in
Bargains
other's.
the
of
part
any
after
come
to
is
formance
for
contracts,
be
least one party is to render services must therefore
example, because the performance of services inevitably takes time.
Either the payment for the services must come before the services are
for.
performed, or the services must be performed before they are paid
sale
the
for
bargains
Once the industrial revolution began, even most
of goods had to be contracts, because goods then began to be produced
far from where they would be used, and buyers and sellers therefore
had to deal with each other over long distances. Either the buyer had
deto pay for the goods before he received them, or the seller had to
16.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 1 (1981) (Contract Defined).
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liver the goods before he was paid for them.17 Therefore, since the
industrial revolution, one can say the same of contracts as one could
previously have said only about bargains: economic markets operate
through contracts and could not operate without them.
Markets are important because, as Adam Smith so famously
it,
they are the "invisible hand" by which individual gain is made toput
serve
the public good.18 Contracts are both the means by which markets
harness the individual gain and the means by which the individual
gain is made to serve the public good. Both parties must expect
to
gain from a contract or they would not make it. In the large majority
of instances, both parties do gain, even if not quite as much as they
had hoped. For example, a lawyer contracts with a painter to paint
the lawyer's house. The house will be better painted than if the lawyer painted it herself, and the lawyer will work many fewer hours
at
her job as a lawyer to earn the money to pay the painter than it would
take her to paint the house herself. The painter will work many fewer
hours painting the house than he would need to work to do or make
the things for which he spends the money he will earn from painting
the house. Both parties will gain even more from the contract the
painter makes with the seller of the paint, because the paint will be
the product of centuries of technological and organizational progress,
which would be impossible for either the painter or the lawyer to have
done themselves.
Markets make the individual gain serve the public good by engendering economic competition. The sellers whose goods the buyers
like the most make the most profits and therefore prosper and expand,
while the sellers who fail to offer goods that buyers like eventually
disappear. Sellers are thereby encouraged to improve their goods and
to lower the costs of producing them, both of which increase the public
good. Contracts play essential roles in this process both in the obvious
sense that markets could not function without them, because
purchase and sale is a contract, and in the not-so-obvious senseevery
that
they are the links in the chains by which large numbers of individuals
bind themselves together in the cooperative efforts that improve goods
and lower the costs of producing them. The links in the chains
which individuals are organized into firms, the links in the chains by
by
which firms distribute and sell what they produce, and the links in the
chains that bind firms to their suppliers and all the other firms with
which they interact, are all contracts. Adam Smith also pointed this
out.19
17. W.

DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE

2

0TH CENTURY REFORMATION

OF CONTRACT LAW 9-11 (1996).
18. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edwin
Cannon ed., Random House

1937) (1776).
19. Id. at 11-12, 22-29; see also JOHN

RAWLS,

A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342-47 (1971).
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Although many contracts presumably would be made and kept
even if the law did not enforce them, the law's enforcing them encourages the making of more of them and increases the value of those that
are made by providing an important additional assurance that they
will be kept. For example, if the law did not enforce contracts, the
lawyer and the painter would have had to make and accept frequent
partial payments, preceded or followed by the lawyer inspecting the
just completed part of the painter's work, because neither could risk
investing much of his or her money or time without first knowing that
the other had done his or her part. And even then, the lawyer would
have no protection against defects that would not show up until
months or years later, such as the painter's use of inferior paint, and
to
the painter would have no protection against the lawyer's refusal
work.
the
of
completion
his
follow
to
was
that
make the payment
Thus, even if both did perform as promised, the costs of their performances would have been increased.
at
For all these reasons, it is extremely important that contracts be
collapse
eventually
would
markets
least generally enforced. Economic
if they were not, and even in the short run they would operate much
be
less efficiently, and technological and industrial progress would
greatly slowed.
The Institution of Credit and Finance: Contracts as
Property
Almost all the instruments of credit and finance are contracts.
Stocks, bonds, loans of all kinds, accounts of all kinds (bank accounts,
charge accounts, credit card accounts, money market accounts, etc.),
shares in joint ventures, partnerships, and "funds" (mutual funds,
pension funds, hedge funds, etc.) are all contracts. The English equity
the
courts had made contract rights generally assignable by the end of
the
by
suit
seventeenth century, the English law courts had followed
exso
did
cases
both
in
courts
end of the eighteenth century, and the
resystems
finance
and
credit
emerging
plicitly because the then
that
required
they
because
it
required
systems
These
quired it.
bought and sold.20
stocks, bonds, loans, etc. be capable of being
If something can be bought and sold, it is property. The instruments of credit and finance are therefore property. As such, any conis an
tract right that can be assigned is property, whether it
allows
law
the
rule,
a
as
and,
not,
or
finance
and
instrument of credit
21
The United States Supreme Court
any contract right to be assigned.
proprecognized in 1972 that even unassignable contract rights are
without
deprivation
against
them
erty for the purpose of protecting

B.

20. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, §§ 11.1-11.2.
21. Id.
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due process of law.22 Without contracts, the institutions of credit and
finance could not exist.
Ill. MEETING THE INSTITUTIONS' NEEDS
The expectation measure meets the needs of these institutions
in
four crucial respects: 1) it provides a remedy for every breach;
2) it
makes contracts enforceable as soon as they are made; 3)
it compensates the injured party for what he has lost, as the institution
concerned values that loss; and 4) it provides the right incentives
for
decisions whether to breach. Neither of the other measures
meets
these institutions' needs in even one such respect. Each of
these respects is discussed in turn.
A.

Providing a Remedy for Every Breach
There is no situation in which the expectation measure cannot
be
used, whereas the law only allows either of the other measures
to
be
used if there was a so-called "material" or "total" breach23-a
breach
serious enough to entitle the injured party to withhold her
performance and cancel the contract. 24 This limitation is not arbitrary.
A
party cannot incur a reliance loss unless the other party's
material
breach entitles him to cancel the contract, and he cancels it.
This is so
because as long as the contract is still in force, the breaching
party
still owes the non-breaching party her performance, the
receipt of
which was what he relied upon. Likewise, for a restitutional
entitlement, as long as the contract is still in force, the breaching
party still
owes the non-breaching party her performance, which was the
agreed
exchange for any benefits she may have received from him
as a result
of her breach.
Moreover, even if the law allowed him to, a plaintiff could
not use
either of the other measures to recover in the event of a partial
breach
because the notion of a reliance or a restitution recovery for
a partial
breach is incoherent. To illustrate, assume that Contractor
enters
into a typical contract with Owner to build a house for $100,000.
Assume further that Contractor performs perfectly, but Owner
pays her
only $95,000. In this instance, what is Contractor's reliance
loss or
restitutional entitlement? There is no sensible answer to either
ques22. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972); Perry
v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 601 (1972). Of course the Court has recognized that stocks,
bonds and other
instruments of credit and finance are property since long before
1972. The cases
cited extended this recognition to contract rights generally.
The cases involved
employees' rights under contracts of employment, which
are generally not
assignable.
23. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, §§ 12.16 (reliance measure),
12.20 (restitution
measure).
24. Id. § 8.15.
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tion, because the only loss she suffered was $5,000 of her expectancy.
The opposite situation also makes the point. Suppose that Owner
paid the $100,000 but Contractor left a defect that would cost Owner
$5,000 to correct. There is no sensible answer to what Owner's reliance loss or restitutional entitlement is in this case either, although
his expectation loss of $5,000 is clear.
Sales of tangible property also serve to illustrate the point. Suppose a sale of a shipload of crude oil warranted to have sulfur content
of no more than 0.50 percent tests at 0.54 percent. Suppose further
that the excess sulfur will cost the buyer $10,000 in additional refining costs to remove. Again, although the expectation loss is obviously
$10,000, there is no logical answer to the question of what is the reliance loss or the restitutional entitlement. The inability of either the
reliance or the restitution measure to provide a recovery in cases of
only partial breach is extremely important, because neither of the
principal institutions in which contracts are used could function if
partial breaches were not reimbursed. Creditors could not recover
damages for late payments or for small payments that were never
made. Persons who had contracted for services to be performed could
not recover for small defects or only moderately incomplete performances. Buyers could not recover for defects in goods they had
accepted.
There is no reference to the restriction of the reliance and restitution measures to cases of total breach anywhere in the Fuller and Perdue article. The authors were evidently unaware of it.
B.

Making Contracts Enforceable as Soon as They Are Made

Although any contract is enforceable in principle as soon as it is
made, it is only enforceable as a practical matter if a breach would
give the injured party the right to recover enough damages to make it
worthwhile to sue. The expectation measure gives such a right immediately, because it entitles each party to recover the profits she could
reasonably have expected to make if the contract were performed, and
if each party did not expect that she would make a profit if the other
performed, the contract would not have been made. 25
The reliance measure, however, does not make a contract enforceable by either party until she has relied on it to her substantial detriment. Thus, either party could breach the contract without incurring
any liability at all until the other had relied on it to some extent, and
either could breach without incurring enough liability to make the
other's litigating worthwhile until the other had relied to a substantial
extent. Businesses could hardly function if damages were limited in
this way, because "deals" would never "close." For example, two busi25. See supra section II.A.
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nesses could negotiate for months over a joint venture before they finally reached agreement, but either one could still change its mind
and call the whole thing off or insist on renegotiating some point to
which it had already agreed, with impunity, if it did so before the
other had substantially relied. Transaction costs would be greatly increased, because contracts would have to be renegotiated indefinitely
until one party finally "took the plunge" and substantially relied. Productive efficiency would be reduced, because the pace of business
would be slowed. Neither party could rely on obtaining the profit he
expected from a contract until the other had fully performed, because
all that either could recover if the other party breached would be the
costs he had already incurred.
If the law were to limit injured parties to a restitution recovery, the
results would be even worse. Neither party would then be entitled to
a large enough recovery to make litigating worthwhile until the other
had benefited substantially at her expense. That would nearly always
take a long time to happen, and in the large majority of cases it would
never happen, unless the benefit was merely the receipt of a deposit or
a partial payment of the purchase price. Further, if the deposit or
partial payment was the benefit, getting it back would still leave the
injured party without her expected profits and the breaching party
without any penalty for having breached. Restitution recoveries provide no deterrence against breaching even in the relatively rare situations in which they do provide sufficient compensation to the injured
party.
C.

Compensating the Injured Party for What He Has Lost
1. Damages Under the Expectation Measure

The expectation measure gives the injured party the value of his
bargain in every case. This is the value that the economic market
places on contracts, because it is in order to obtain this value that the
26
contracts which are used in economic markets are made.
The expectation measure also gives the injured party the value of
his property in the contract, which is necessary if the institutions of
credit and finance are to function as they should. Although particular
items of property may have sentimental, personal, aesthetic or other
noneconomic values, if an item has an economic value, that value is
the profit or other use an owner of it could expect to get from it, discounted by the risk that the expectation will not be realized. For example, the economic value of an apartment house is estimated by
reference to the profit (rents in excess of maintenance and operation
costs) an owner could expect to make from it, discounted by the risk
that the profit will not be realized. Likewise, the economic value of an
26. See supra section II.A.
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automobile is the use one could expect to get from it, discounted by the
risk that something will go wrong with it before its expected use is
realized. The instruments of credit or finance are valued the same
way because their values are their economic values. For example,
stocks are valued according to the profits the corporations are expected to make in the future, discounted by the risk that they will not
make them. If the stocks are not publicly traded, investors make
these estimates for themselves. If the stocks are publicly traded, the
buying and selling of them on the public markets based on these estimates by investors, brokers, fund managers, speculators and others
determines the market prices at which they are bought and sold. The
expectation measure is the value of a contract right in a market economy, at least if the right is assignable, as it generally is.
2. Damages Under the Reliance Measure
a.

The Shortfall

Recoveries under the reliance measure fall short of both institutions' needs, because there are no such recoveries at all for partial
breaches, and even for total breaches the recoveries do not include the
27
expected profits or the costs incurred before the contract was made.
The last limitation is not only the law, it is inherent in the logic of the
measure, because the injured party cannot have incurred costs in reliance on the contract unless he incurred them after the contract was
made. Fuller and Perdue were also evidently unaware of this limitation on the use of the reliance measure, 28 just as they were of the limitation of its use to cases of total breach.
This limitation makes the reliance measure especially inadequate,
because most of the costs of producing or marketing products in a
modern economy are incurred before the products are sold. For example, a manufacturer will likely have incurred practically all the costs
of manufacturing the product before it sells it to a wholesaler or retailer and will likely incur little if any additional costs thereafter. The
same will be the case for the wholesaler or retailer. The only costs
most retailers incur after making a sale are the costs of a plastic or
paper bag. Likewise for agricultural products, for which all the costs
of owning the land and of planting, tending and harvesting the crop
will generally have been incurred before the crop is sold. Even for
services contracts, in which the services are to be rendered after the
contract is made, the seller will at least have incurred its overhead
costs before the contract was made.
For the kinds of total breaches that can occur in the systems of
credit and finance, the reliance measure does even worse. If borrow27. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.16.
28. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 74.
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ers breached, lenders could recover only what they had lent, plus legal
interest, no matter what the agreed interest rate had been. If corporations breached, shareholders could recover only what the purchasers
of the shares had paid when the corporation first issued its shares,
plus legal interest, because as assignees of the original shareholders'
rights, all subsequent shareholders would have no more rights than
the original shareholders would have had.29 Options to buy long or
sell short would be worth no more than the paper they were printed
on.
b. Attempts to Prove this Shortfall Is Unimportant or Does
Not Exist
Fuller and Perdue claimed that the reliance measure provides as
large a recovery as the expectation measure does when lost opportunities are taken into account. Their reasoning was that the injured
party could have made the same profit on a contract with someone
else if he had not made it with the party who breached.3o They offered
the following example:
Physicians with an extensive practice often charge their patients the full office
call fee for broken appointments. Such a charge looks on the face of things
like a claim to the promised fee; it seems to be based on the "expectation interest." Yet the physician making the charge will quite justifiably regard it as
compensation for the loss of the opportunity to gain a similar fee from a different patient. This foregoing of other opportunities is involved to some extent in
entering most contracts, and the impossibility of subjecting this type of reliance to any kind of measurement may justify a categorical rule granting the
value of the expectancy as the most effective way of compensating for such
3 1
losses.

Although the example seems to support the claim, it does not.
First, the breaches were total breaches-the patients did not show up
for their appointments-so the example does not include cases of only
partial breach, in which the reliance measure provides no recovery at
all. Second, although the example correctly describes the consequences of a total breach by a buyer-patients are buyers of a physician's services-when the seller has only a limited supply of the thing
to sell, it does not include the consequences of a total breach by a
buyer when the seller has an unlimited supply of the thing to sell.
The latter kind of seller is much more common than the former in a
modern economy. (Physicians' supplies are limited because what they
sell is their time, at least as Fuller and Perdue pictured it.)
Dean William D. Hawkland was apparently the first to explain the
significance of this distinction, in a book published in 1958.32 When a
29.
30.
31.
32.

CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13, §§ 18.3, 18.17.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 60.
Id.
HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 153-54.
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buyer breaches a contract with a seller who has an unlimited supply of
something, the seller loses the profits he would have made on that
sale, and he does not recover them on other sales he makes thereafter,
because he would have made the other sales anyway, not having only
a limited supply of the thing. Therefore, he did not lose any opportunities to sell to others when the first buyer breached. For example, an
automobile manufacturer can typically supply its dealers with as
many cars as they can sell. Therefore, if a buyer orders a car from a
dealer but refuses to accept it when the dealer tenders delivery of it,
the dealer loses the profits it would have made on the sale of that car.
This is so even if the dealer sells the same car for the same price to a
second buyer, because if the first buyer had accepted the car, the
dealer could have ordered another car from the manufacturer and sold
it to the second buyer. The same is generally the case today even for
sellers of services. For example, an air conditioning service can typically sell its services to as many customers as request them. It schedules its calls for a few days ahead, and if an unusually large number of
requests come in, it merely schedules some of them for further ahead
than it usually would or puts its employees on overtime.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg and Robert Cooter tried to salvage something from Fuller and Perdue's claim by saying it would be correct in a
perfectly competitive market, because the sellers in such markets
have only limited supplies by definition. Eisenberg and Cooter also
pointed out, however, that the risk that the buyer with whom the
seller would otherwise have contracted would also have breached was
vanishingly small. They were willing to make this assumption themselves, apparently because they thought it would generally be the
fact. 3 3 However, it almost certainly would not be the fact if contracting parties were limited to recovering their reliance damages by
law. Under such a limitation, every buyer or seller with whom a seller
or buyer might otherwise have contracted would have had the same,
potentially enormous, economic incentive to breach as did the actual
buyer or seller. Suppose for example that a farmer contracted to sell
his bean crop to a food processor shortly before he planted it and that
by the time he harvested it, a drought in another part of the country
had sent the market price of beans up to twice the contract price. If
this farmer repudiated and sold his beans on the market instead,
would it be reasonable to assume that some other farmer with whom
the food processor might have contracted would not have done the
same? More likely, every farmer in the area with a similar contract
would also have repudiated. More likely still, under a law that limited
recoveries to the reliance measure, neither farmers nor food processors would ever have made such contracts in the first place, because
33. Eisenberg & Cooter, supra note 11, at 1445-49.
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both would have known that they could not enforce them if it turned
out to be to the other party's advantage to breach.
3. Damages Under the Restitution Measure
Recoveries under the restitution measure also fall short of the institutions' needs by not providing anything at all for partial breaches.
However, the question of their adequacies for meeting the institutions'
needs for total breaches is complicated by the existence of some incoherencies in the concept of the restitution measure itself. The measure in theory and the measure in practice are very different things.
a.

The Restitution Measure in Theory

Fuller and Perdue, and the standard authorities, all define the restitution recovery as a recovery of a benefit the defendant obtained at
the plaintiffs expense as a result of the breach. 3 4 They all, therefore,
at some point also refer to it as avoiding "unjust enrichment."35 This
definition, however, is inconsistent with their implicit assumption
that the restitution measure provides something that the expectation
measure does not. For, if the benefit the defendant obtained was at
the plaintiffs expense, the expectation measure already includes it,
because it would then have been the plaintiffs benefit if the defendant
had not breached.
Take, for example, a contract for the sale of goods in a perfectly
competitive market such as a securities or commodities market. If the
market price at the time for delivery is higher than the contract price,
and the seller breaches by selling the goods at the higher market price
to someone else instead, the restitution measure is the difference between the contract and the market price. But this would also be the
expectation measure, because the buyer could have gotten this profit
himself if the seller had performed. Likewise, if the market price at
the time for delivery is lower than the contract price, and the buyer
breaches by buying the goods from someone else at the lower market
price, the restitution measure would here again be the difference between the contract and the market price. But again, this would also
be the expectation measure, because the seller could have gotten this
profit herself if the buyer had performed. Another example is the
buyer's right to the return of his deposit if the seller has materially
breached, which courts often call "restitutional,"36 although it could
just as logically be characterized as reliance (because the buyer made
34. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, 53-54; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 344(c) (1981) (Purposes of Remedies); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13,
§ 15.2; FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.1.
35. See sources cited supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311, 313-14 (N.Y. 1972).
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it in reliance on the contract) or expectation (because it was a part of
the buyer's cost of performance of the contract, her performance being
paying the price).
The facts of Pattersonv. Meyerhofer3 7 provide another illustration.
The defendant contracted to buy four parcels of land from the plaintiff
for a total price of $23,000 on the understanding that the plaintiff
would bid for them at a foreclosure auction. The plaintiffs profit (or
loss) would thus be the difference between what he could get them for
at auction and the $23,000 which the contract obligated the defendant
to pay him for them. However, the defendant attended the auction
herself and outbid the plaintiff, paying a total of $22,380 for the parcels. The court awarded the plaintiff $620 in expectation damages,
because this would have been his profit if the defendant had not
breached. That the $620 award also fits the description of restitutional damages is obvious.
Thus, the restitution measure, by its own definition, never provides a recovery that the expectation measure would not, and the recovery it provides is often less. The interest it is supposed to protect is
therefore illusory; it does not exist apart from the expectation interest
and is always included in it.
b.

The Restitution Measure in Practice

In practice, however, there is one situation in which the restitution
measure provides a larger recovery than the expectation (or reliance)
measure would. This is the case in which a material breach by one
party entitles the other to cease performing a contract on which he is
losing money-the "losing contract" case. United States ex. rel.
38
Coastal Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Algernon Blair, Inc. provides a well
known example of this factual scenario. The defendant, a general contractor, had contracted with the plaintiff, one of its subcontractors, "to
perform certain steel erection and supply certain equipment in conjunction with ... [the work]."39 The parties disputed who was to pay
the rent on the cranes the plaintiff was using. The plaintiff quit when
the defendant refused to pay the rent, after the plaintiff had completed twenty-eight percent of the work. Although the district court
found that the contract required the defendant to pay the rent, so that
the defendant was the party in breach, it declined to award any damages, because it also found that the plaintiff would have lost more
than the defendant owed it in damages if the plaintiff had completed
the work. The court of appeals, in an opinion written by Learned
Hand, reversed. It held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the
37. 97 N.E. 472 (N.Y. 1912).
38. 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 640.
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value of its work, which was to be measured by how much the defendant would have had to pay another subcontractor to do it at the same
time and place, without regard to the contract price. 40 The measure of
recovery the court of appeals prescribed would provide more than the
expectation measure would have, because the expectation measure
was what the district court had used.
However, whatever one may think of its justice, this was not a restitution recovery, because the defendant had not benefited at the
plaintiffs expense. Rather, the plaintiff had benefited at the defendant's expense. The plaintiff benefited by being excused from continuing to work on a job upon which it was losing money. The benefit was
at the defendant's expense, because the defendant lost the right to
have the plaintiff complete the work for less than the work was worth.
Moreover, the amount of the recovery was arbitrary. By its logic, a
defendant has to pay more the later he breaches, unless he does not
breach until after the plaintiff has fully performed, in which case an
exception applies, and the plaintiff is relegated to his expectation
damages.41 And the amount the defendant has to pay bears no relation to how much, if anything, he may have benefited from the breach
or how much, if anything, his breach may have cost the plaintiff.
The rationale of decisions like Algernon Blair seems to be the following: The law only entitles a plaintiff to use the restitution measure
if the plaintiff canceled the contract after the defendant committed a
material breach. Canceling the contract leaves the defendant unjustly
enriched at the plaintiffs expense. The law of restitution-notthe restitution measure of damages for breach-therefore entitles the plaintiff to recover from the defendant the value of this enrichment, the
measure of which is what the defendant would have had to pay someone else to provide the same services at the same time and place.4 2
Although this rationale is logical, it arbitrarily enriches the plaintiff
and punishes the defendant as just described, and it would do both of
these things with or without the exception for the plaintiff having
completed his performance by the time the defendant breached.
c. A Suggestion for Reducing the Unfairness and
Arbitrarinessof the Restitution Measure in Practice
The plaintiffs in cases like Algernon Blair should recover for the
work they have done, at the contract rate, plus any incidental damages the breach may have caused them, and nothing more. This
would leave them better off than if their contracts had not been
breached, because they would not have to lose even more by complet40. Id. at 640-41.
41. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13, § 15.6.
42. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 152 (1936) (Value of Services Acquired by Consciously Tortious Conduct).
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ing them, and it would punish the defendants for having breached by
depriving them of the benefit of the plaintiffs completing their performances for less than the performances were worth. However, these
amounts of enrichment and punishment would be neither excessive
nor arbitrary, and they would be enough to prevent the breaching
party from benefiting at the injured party's expense.
D.

Providing the Right Incentives for Decisions Whether to
Breach

A breach of contract is "Pareto efficient" if it benefits someone and
does not leave anyone worse off.4 3 Public policy favors such a breach,
because society as a whole benefits if some persons benefit and no one
is harmed. Only the expectation measure provides the right incentives for making breaches Pareto efficient, because only this measure
leaves the party who did not breach neither worse nor better off than
if the contract had been performed. A measure that provided more
damages than the expectation measure would discourage some
breaches that would be efficient. A measure that provided less damages than the expectation measure would encourage some breaches
that would not be efficient. Therefore, both the reliance and the restitution measures would not provide the right incentives for deciding
whether to breach, because they both generally provide less damages
than the expectation measure would-if they provide any damages at
all.
Although providing the right incentives for deciding whether to
breach is important, it is the least important of all the institutional
reasons for favoring the expectation measure, which is why I have put
it last. These incentives are irrelevant for most breaches, because
most breaches result from human weakness or miscalculation-carelessness, mistake, laziness, scheduling too many jobs to do at the same
time, etc.-rather than from a conscious decision to breach. Moreover,
usually nobody benefits from them, so that they could not have been
made efficiently even if the breaching party had made them intentionally. And even in most cases of intentional breach, the motivation is
not to use resources more profitably or more beneficially for someone
else, but to reduce one's costs by "cutting a corner" or cheating in some
other way, in the hope that the other party won't notice or won't do
anything about it if she does.

43. Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damages Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALY.
SIS OF LAw 13-14 (5th ed. 1998).
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The Legitimate Uses of the Restitution and Reliance
Measures in Contract Law

The law of restitution comes into play in contractual situations
whenever one party would otherwise be unjustly enriched at the
other's expense. 4 4 These uses of the law of restitution, however, are to
be distinguished from the uses of restitution damages for breach, none
of which is legitimate, at least in my opinion.45
On the other hand, the reliance measure still has some legitimate
uses. Before describing them, however, I will distinguish a situation
in which although the reliance measure is frequently used, it is not
necessary, because the expectation measure already includes it. Injured parties who cannot prove their lost profits often use the reliance
measure to recover their costs. 4 6 There is no necessity of using this
measure in this situation, however, if-but only if-the costs were
costs of performance, because an injured party can recover his costs of
performance under the expectation measure, whether or not he can
prove his lost profits.47 Moreover, the expectation measure provides a
superior ground of recovery in this situation, because it entitles the
injured party to recover his costs whether or not he incurred them
after the contract was made; whereas the reliance measure is limited
to costs incurred after the contract was made. 48
This brings us to a situation for which the reliance measure is still
necessary to do justice. If the costs were not costs of performing the
contract, so that the expectation measure would not include them, the
reliance measure still entitles the plaintiff to recover these costs if he
incurred them after the contract was made. It is just that the injured
party recovers these costs, because if he had not expected the contract
to be profitable enough to cover them, he would not have made it. So,
he presumably would have made enough profits to cover these nonperformance costs if the other party had not breached. (In my opinion,
the expectation measure ought to be construed to include them by the
same logic, but I have never seen this done.) For example, if the plaintiff quit her job in reliance on a contract for a new job with the defendant, which was employment-at-will or for an indeterminate duration,
and the defendant totally breached, the courts have generally allowed
the plaintiff to recover the compensation she lost by quitting and her
44. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, §§ 8.14 (applying when a party's rightful
termination of the contract because of the other party's total breach leaves the
first party unjustly enriched at the second party's expense), 9.6 (applying when
an unanticipated event makes a contract voidable).
45. See supra subsection III.C.3.
46. See, e.g., Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 51 S.W.2d 572 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1932); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.16.
47. Beefy Trial, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 267 So. 2d 853, 858-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (Owen, J., dissenting); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13, § 14.9.
48. See supra subsection III.C.2.
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The
costs of searching for a new job under the reliance measure.
current definitions of the expectation measure would not include these
losses and costs, because they are neither expected profits nor costs of
performance.
The reliance measure is also useful in connection with the second
kind of defense of unilateral mistake, which applies when the mistake
was not so obvious that the other party should have noticed it.50 The
party who made the mistake is entitled to rescind the contract if certain conditions are satisfied, one of which is that the other party has
not relied on the mistake to his detriment.5 1 Although there are no
reported decisions on the issue, Melvin Aron Eisenberg has suggested
that the party who made the mistake should be entitled to rescind
even if the other party has relied to his detriment, provided the first
party pays the other's reliance damages. 5 2 Eisenberg's suggestion is
53
so sensible that it will surely become part of the law at some point.
However, such reliance damages would not be for breach of contract,
they would be for compensating the other party for her detrimental
they
reliance on the mistake. As such, if one had to categorize them,
54
would be considered damages for the commission of a tort.

IV.

THE THREE INTERESTS THESIS OF FULLER
AND PERDUE

The Fuller and Perdue three interests thesis5 includes the following
errors in addition to those already identified.5
49. See, e.g., Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 399 A.2d 1374 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1979); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.16.
50. The other party is not permitted to make the contract by "snapping it up," if it is
that obvious. This is the first kind of unilateral mistake. CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 13, § 9.27.
51. Id.
52. LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 699 (6th ed.
1996).
53. Indeed, CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 13, § 9.27 already states the law as
though it included Eisenberg's suggestion.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. 1 (1965) (General Principles).
55. The errors already identified are: The restitution interest as Fuller and Perdue
defined it does not exist apart from the expectation interest, which already includes it, supra subsection III.C.3, and the reliance measure is not the equivalent
of the expectation measure if lost opportunities are taken into account, as Fuller
and Perdue maintained it was, for at least four reasons. First, it provides no
recovery at all for partial breaches, id. Second, even for total breaches, it does not
include the costs the plaintiff incurred before the contract was made, supra subsection III.C.2. Third, most breaches by far in a modern economy do not result in
lost opportunities, so that even if including lost opportunities would make a reliance recovery equal an expectation recovery in some cases, such cases are rare,
id. Fourth, the reliance measure would not include lost opportunities in practice
if it were the norm, because anyone else with whom the injured party might have

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
A.

[Vol. 81:839

Ignoring Context

Although there may be some very fundamental principles ofjustice
that are true in every time or place for all mankind, surely the measure of damages for breach of contract is not one of them. Rather, the
answer to the question of what such measure is the most just must
depend on the answers to other questions about the context in which
the measures are to play their roles. Examples of such questions include the following: How does the society concerned conceive of contracts? What purposes do contracts in that society serve? In
particular, what purposes do damages for breach of contract in that
society serve? Yet, Fuller and Perdue began their article not by asking, but by answering the question of what purposes contract damages
serve, asserting that they serve to protect the three "interests" of restitution, reliance and expectation. 5 6 They then ranked these interests
in the order of importance in which I have just stated them because,
they claimed, "ordinary standards of justice" made this ranking "obvi57
ous."

Although they later referred to a possible institutional justifi-

cation for the expectation measure, it was only to immediately dismiss
it as irrelevant on grounds of circularity.58
B.

Using an Inappropriate Concept of Justice
Although Fuller and Perdue grounded their ranking of the three

interests on what they claimed were "obvious ...

ordinary standards

of justice," they still sought to justify the ranking by demonstrating
that it was in accordance with Aristotle's concept of justice, which
was, in their paraphrase, "the maintenance of an equilibrium of goods
among members of society."5 9 They then had to characterize the making and performing of contracts as departures from this equilibrium in
order to demonstrate this accordance.60
However, whatever validity Aristotle's concept of justice may have
had for the civilization of ancient Greece, in which men, women and
slaves each had their place, it is inappropriate for the modern age and
for a modern market economy in particular. The ideal now is not equilibrium, but progress. People now are admired for obtaining more
goods for themselves, not condemned for it, provided they use only the
legitimate means that markets make available to them, including the
made the same contract presumably would have breached for the same reason
that the breaching party did, id.
56. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 53.

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

56.
59-60.
56.
56-57.
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making and performing of contracts. This is so because, as Adam
Smith put it, markets make individual gain serve the public good.6 1
C.

Describing the Institutional Approach as Circular

In their article, Fuller and Perdue acknowledged that "[iin a society in which credit has become a significant and pervasive institution,
it is inevitable that the expectancy created by an enforceable promise
should be regarded as a kind of property, and breach of the promise as
an injury to that property."6 2 However, they rejected the credit system as an institutional basis for the expectation measure on the
ground that accepting it would be circular. They asked, "A promise
has present value, why? Because the law enforces it. 'The expectancy,' regarded as a present value, is not the cause of legal intervention but the consequence of it."63 They then went on to "reinforce"
their rejection by pointing to the fact that the law generally enforced
promises long before there was anything corresponding to a general
64
credit system.
However, it is an error to think that justification is a matter of
cause. Even if it were a fact that contracts (i.e., enforceable promises)
have present value only because the law enforces them (i.e., because
the law awards expectation damages), that would not prevent the fact
that the credit system treats contracts as property from being an institutional justification for the expectation measure. For if the credit
system requires the use of the expectation measure to function effectively, as Fuller and Perdue acknowledged it does, this is all that matters for justification purposes. It is irrelevant whether the credit
system or the expectation measure came first historically. Presumably, if English law was not already generally enforcing promises when
England first developed a credit system, the newly emergent institutional powers would have quickly seen to it that the law was changed
to generally enforce promises. Or, if English law was already generally enforcing promises when England first developed a credit system,
the credit system would immediately have made use of the law because the credit system required the law in order to function effectively. The credit system would be an institutional foundation of the
law either way.
Asking which came first, an institution or a law it requires, is a
little like asking which came first, the chicken or the egg. The historical fact is most likely to be that they developed together. This was
true with Anglo-American contract law and the institution of the mar61.
62.
63.
64.

See supra section II.A.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 59.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
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ket economy. Although an Anglo-American law of contract already existed in the eighteenth century, it was rudimentary. Contracting was
time-consuming, and legal technicalities made the outcome of contract
litigation uncertain. Moreover, contractually set prices and other
terms of sale ran the risk of being illegal for conflicting with the socalled "duties of the common callings," the prices and other terms of
which were set by law, at least in principle. The English and American courts did not begin the development of the contract law we now
generally call "classical contract" until late in the eighteenth century,
which, not merely by coincidence, is also the time at which historians
mark the beginning of market economies in England and the United
States.65
D.

Asserting that Contracts Have Present Value Only
Because the Law Enforces Them

In their article, Fuller and Perdue wrote that "[a] promise has present value, why? Because the law enforces it."66 Although it is certainly true that contracts generally have greater present values
because the law enforces them than they would have if the law did not
enforce them, it does not follow that if the law did not enforce them,
they would have no present value. All sorts of other factors-honor,
reputation, reciprocity ("I will keep my promises to you if you keep
yours to me."), and simple honesty, for example-also contribute. The
debts that underdeveloped countries owe to lenders in developed countries are a current example. These debts total in the trillions of dollars, and of course the lenders to whom they are owed would never
have lent the money in the first place if they did not think the loans
would be valuable. Yet there are no courts with the power to compel
these countries to pay their debts, and during the international debt
crisis of the 1980s, there was apprehension that some countries would
unilaterally renounce their contracts. 67 Of course many of these loans
are now valued at less than their face values, but they still have some
value-trillions of dollars of it. Fuller and Perdue's assertion that
"[t]he expectancy, regarded as a present value, is not the cause of legal
intervention but the consequence of it,"68 is false, as this example
demonstrates.

65. SLAWSON, supra note 2, at 9-11.
66. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 59.
67. See, e.g., Steven M. Cohen, Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin
American Debt Revolution, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 89, 98-99 (1988).
68. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 59-60.
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Identifying the General Enforceability of Promises as the
Legal Basis for the Credit System

It was not, as Fuller and Perdue maintained, the general enforceability of promises that made contract rights property, 6 9 rather, as ex70
plained earlier, it was the general assignability of contract rights.
F.

Asserting that Expectation Damages Are Generally
Easier to Prove than Reliance Damages

Fuller and Perdue's final conclusion was that, although there were
no good reasons for protecting the expectation interest, a good reason
for using the expectation measure of damages as the norm was that it
generally results in the same recovery as the reliance measure would
and is easier to prove. 7 1 I have already explained why the two measures do not generally result in the same recovery. 72 I will now explain why the expectation measure is also not generally easier to
prove.
As even first year law students now learn, the very opposite is the
case: Reliance damages are always easier to prove than expectation
damages. Reliance damages consist of the costs the plaintiff incurred
after the contract was made and before the defendant breached. Expectation damages consist of these costs, plus all the other costs the
plaintiff incurred, plus the profit the plaintiff would have made if the
defendant had not breached. Thus, proving expectation damages is
always more difficult, because it always requires proving the reliance
damages and more.
It is for this reason that the most common use of the reliance measure is to obtain a recovery when the plaintiff cannot prove the profits
he would have made if the defendant had not breached. 73 For example, in Security Stove & Manufacturing Co. v. American Railways Express Co. ,74 the defendant contracted to deliver twenty-one packages
to Atlantic City, New Jersey, in time for the plaintiff to use their contents to construct an exhibit of its oil burning furnace at a convention
of the American Gas Association. The defendant failed to deliver one
of the packages that contained a crucial part until the convention was
over. The court awarded the plaintiff its reliance damages on the
ground that a plaintiff is entitled to them if he cannot prove his expec75
tation damages.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 60.
See supra section II.B.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 60-62.
See supra sections III.A-III.B.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.16 (making the same point).
51 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
Id. at 577.
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CONCLUSION

The expectation measure, and only it, meets the needs of the principal institutions in a modern market economy in which contracts are
used, in four critical respects. It provides a remedy for every breach.
It makes contracts enforceable as soon as they are made. It compensates the injured party for what he has lost, as the institution concerned values that loss. And it provides the right incentives for
decisions whether to breach. Neither of the other measures meets
these institutions' needs in even one of these respects. These institutions would collapse if damages for breach of contract were limited to
either of the other measures. The three interests thesis is much too
flawed to be of use for comparing the merits of the three measures.
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APPENDIX
Excerpts from L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 176
(starred numbers indicate original pagination)

[53*] It is convenient to distinguish three principal purposes which
may be pursued in awarding contract damages. These purposes, and
the situations in which they become appropriate, may be stated briefly
as follows:
First, the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the defendant
conferred some value on the defendant. The defendant fails to perform his promise. The court may force the defendant to disgorge the
value [54*] he received from the plaintiff. The object here may be
termed the prevention of gain by the defaulting promisor at the expense of the promisee; more briefly, the prevention of unjust enrichment. The interest protected may be called the restitution interest.
For our present purposes it is quite immaterial how the suit in such a
case be classified, whether as contractual or quasi-contractual,
whether as a suit to enforce the contract or as a suit based upon a
rescission of the contract. These questions relate to the superstructure of the law, not to the basic policies with which we are concerned.
Secondly, the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the defendant changed his position. For example, the buyer under a contract
for the sale of land has incurred expense in the investigation of the
seller's title, or has neglected the opportunity to enter other contracts.
We may award damages to the plaintiff for the purpose of undoing the
harm which his reliance on the defendant's promise has caused him.
Our object is to put him in as good a position a he was in before the
promise was made. The interest protected in this case may be called
the reliance interest.
Thirdly, without insisting on reliance by the promisee or enrichment of the promisor, we may seek to give the promisee the value of
the expectancy which the promise created. We may in a suit for specific performance actually compel the defendant to render the promised performance to the plaintiff, or, in a suit for damages, we may
make the defendant pay the money value of this performance. Here
our object is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have
occupied had the defendant performed his promise. The interest protected in this case we may call the expectation interest.
[56*] It is obvious that the three "interests" we have distinguished
do not present equal claims to judicial intervention. It may be as76. 46

YALE

L.J. 52, 53-62 (1936) (footnotes omitted). Reprinted with permission

from the Yale Law Journal.
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sumed that ordinary standards of justice would regard the need for
judicial intervention as decreasing in the order in which we have
listed the three interests. The "restitution interest," involving a combination of unjust impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the
strongest case for relief. If, following Aristotle, we regard the purpose
of justice as the maintenance of an equilibrium of goods among members of society, the restitution interest presents twice as strong a
claim to judicial intervention as the reliance interest, since if A not
only causes B to lose one unit but appropriates that unit to himself,
the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one unit but two.
On the other hand, the promisee who has actually relied on the
promise, even though he may not thereby have enriched the promisor,
certainly presents a more pressing case for relief than the promisee
who merely demands satisfaction for his disappointment in not getting what was promised him. In passing from compensation for
change of position to compensation for loss of expectancy we pass, to
use Aristotle's terms again, from the realm of corrective justice to that
of distributive justice. The law no longer seeks merely to heal a disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a new situation. It ceases to
act defensively or restoratively, and assumed a more active role. With
the transition, the [57*] justification for legal relief loses its self-evident quality. It is as a matter of fact no easy thing to explain why the
normal rule of contract recovery should be that which measures damages by the value of the promised performance. Since this "normal
rule" throws its shadow across our whole subject it will be necessary to
examine the possible reasons for its existence. It may be said
parenthetically that the discussion which follows, though directed primarily to the normal measure of recovery where damages are sought,
also has relevance to the more general question, why should a promise
which has not been relied on ever be enforced at all, whether by a
decree of specific performance or by an award of damages?
WHY SHOULD THE LAW EVER PROTECT THE EXPECTATION INTEREST?

Perhaps the most obvious answer to this question is one which we
may label "psychological."... Whether or not he has actually changed
his position because of the promise, the promisee has formed an attitude of expectancy such that a breach of the promise causes him to feel
that he has been "deprived" of something which was "his." Since this
sentiment is a relatively uniform one, the law has no occasion to go
back of it. It accepts it as a datum and builds its rule about it.
The difficulty with this explanation is that the law does in fact go
back of the sense of injury which the breach of a promise engenders. [58*] No legal system attempts to invest with juristic sanction all
promises. Some rule or combination of rules effects a sifting out for
enforcement of those promises deemed important enough to society to
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justify the law's concern with them.... Therefore, though it may be
assumed that the impulse to assuage disappointment is one shared by
those make and influence the law, this impulse can hardly be regarded as the key which solves the whole problem of the protection
accorded by the law to the expectation interest.
A second possible explanation for the rule protecting the expectancy may be found the much-discussed "will theory" of contract law.
This theory views the contracting parties as exercising, so to speak, a
legislative power, so that the legal enforcement of a contract becomes
merely an implementing by the state of a kind of private law already
established by the parties. ...
... This attitude finds a natural application to promises to pay a
definite sum of money. But certainly as to most [59*] types of contracts it is vain to expect from the will theory a ready-made solution
for the problem of damages.
A third and more promising solution of our difficulty lies in an ecoIn a society in which credit has
nomic or institutional approach ....
become a significant and pervasive institution, it is inevitable that the
expectancy created by an enforceable promise should be regarded as a
kind of property, and breach of the promise as an injury to that
property. ...
The most obvious objection which can be made to the economic or
institutional explanation is that it involves a petitioprincipii. A promise has present value, why? Because the law enforces it. "The expectancy,"[60*] regarded as a present value, is not the cause of legal
intervention but the consequence of it. This objection may be reinforced by a reference to legal history. Promises were enforced long
before there was anything corresponding to a general system of
"credit," and recovery was from the beginning measured by the value
of the promised performance, the "agreed price." It may therefore be
argued that the "credit system," when it finally emerged was itself in
large part built on the foundations of juristic development which preceded it.
The view just suggested asserts the primacy of law over economics;
it sees law not as the creature but as the creator of social institutions.
The shift of emphasis thus implied suggests the possibility of a fourth
explanation for the law's protection of the unrelied-on expectancy,
which we may calljuristic. This explanation would seek a justification
for the normal rule of recovery in some policy consciously pursued by
courts and other lawmakers ....
What reasons can be advanced? In the first place, even if our interest were confined to protecting promisees against an out-of-pocket
loss, it would still be possible to justify the rule granting the value of
the expectancy, both as a cure for, and as a prophylaxis against, losses
of this sort.
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It is a cure for these losses in the sense that it offers the measure of
recovery most likely to reimburse the plaintiff for the (often very numerous and very difficult to prove) individual acts and forbearances
which make up his total reliance on the contract. If we take into account "gains prevented" by reliance, that is, losses involved in foregoing the opportunity to enter other contracts, the notion that the rule
protecting the expectancy is adopted as the most effective means of
compensating for detrimental reliance seems not at all far-fetched.
Physicians with an extensive practice often charge their patients the
full office call fee for broken appointments. Such a charge looks on the
face of things like a claim to the promised fee; it seems to be based on
the "expectation interest." Yet the physician making the charge will
quite justifiably regard it as compensation for the loss of the opportunity to gain a similar fee from a different patient. This foregoing of
other opportunities is involved to some extent in entering most contracts, and the impossibility of subjecting this type of reliance to any
kind of measurement may justify a categorical rule granting the value
of the expectancy as the most effective way of compensating for such
losses. [61*]
In seeking justification for the rule granting the value of the expectancy there is no need, however, to restrict ourselves by the assumption, hitherto made, that the rule can only be intended to cure or
prevent the losses caused by reliance. A justification can be developed
from a less negative point of view. It may be said that there is not
only a policy in favor of preventing and undoing the harms resulting
from reliance, but also a policy in favor of promoting and facilitating
reliance on business agreements. As in the case of the stoplight ordinance we are interested not only in preventing collisions but in speeding traffic. Agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers
or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. When business agreements are not only made but are also acted on, the division
of labor is facilitated, goods find their way to the places where they are
most needed, and economic activity is generally stimulated. These advantages would be threatened[62*] by any rule which limited legal
protection to the reliance interest. Such a rule would in practice tend
to discourage reliance. The difficulties in proving reliance and subjecting it to pecuniary measurement are such that the business man
knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles stood in the way of judicial
relief would hesitate to rely on a promise in any case where the legal
sanction was of significance to him. To encourage reliance we must
therefore dispense with its proof. For this reason it has been found
wise to make recovery on a promise independent of reliance, both in
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the sense that in some cases the promise is enforced though not relied
on (as in the bilateral business agreement) and in the sense that recovery is not limited to the detriment incurred in reliance.

